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Over long periods of time, productivity is the
single most important determinant of a nation’s
living standard or its level of real income.
(Harris 2002, 166)
Thus, trends in productivity are the key
determinants of long-run trends in both
absolute and relative living standards. The
fall-off in real income growth in Canada
and other developed economies since 1973 is
a direct result of slower productivity growth.
(Sharpe, this volume) 
INTRODUCTION
H
igher productivity growth is gener-
ally believed to result in higher real
income and thereby raised living
standards. This is supported by the cross-
country comparison reported in Harris (2002,
Figure 1), which shows a strong correlation
between labour productivity and real wages
across countries. Casual observation of Table
1 suggests that labour productivity (GDP per
hour worked) and the aggregate real wage
(labour income per hour worked) in Canada
have moved together since the mid-1950s.
1
This is reﬂected in annual growth rates aver-
aged over several years. Labour productivity
growth averaged 1.87 percent over the peri-
od 1956-2001, while average real wage
growth was only slightly lower at 1.84 per-
cent.
2 On this basis, the Canadian experience
over the past 46 years appears to support the
conventional wisdom that advances in labour
productivity eventually get reﬂected in real
wage gains at the aggregate level.
Recent developments in Canada, howev-
er, bring into question the stability of the rela-
tionship. Chart 1 shows that labour productivity
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averaged 1.56 percent since 1994, while the
aggregate real wage grew by an average rate of
only 1.11 percent. Thus, advances in labour pro-
ductivity (GDP per hour worked) over the past
eight years have exceeded real wage gains
(labour income per hour worked) by a substan-
tial margin. This implies that labour income has
declined as a proportion of GDP, suggesting
that workers have not received the full beneﬁts
of labour productivity gains.
This paper examines the developments
outlined above from a historical perspective
and considers the implications for living stan-
dards. The following section examines shifts
in labour and non-labour income shares of
GDP over the period 1926-2001. The next
section discusses the implications for living
standards of shifts between labour and non-
labour income shares. The ﬁnal section draws
a few policy conclusions from the analysis.
A NATIONAL ACCOUNTING 
PERSPECTIVE ON HISTORICAL
TRENDS
The measure of labour productivity
referred to above is deﬁned as GDP per hour
worked, while the aggregate real wage is
labour income per hour worked. The two
measures have the same denominator — hours
worked. The ratio of the two measures — the
aggregate real wage/labour productivity — is
therefore equivalent to labour income/GDP.
We focus on labour income as a percentage of
GDP mainly because data on hours worked
are available beginning in 1956 only, whereas
labour income and GDP are available back to
1926. This is also convenient from an account-
ing perspective, because it enables us to
analyse shifts in labour income versus other
components of national income.
Labour Income
It is generally believed that real wage gains
can be sustained over the long run only if sup-
ported by advances in labour productivity (other
things being equal). The standard neoclassical
model predicts that labour productivity growth
(increases in the marginal product of labour) will
be reﬂected in real wage growth (increases in the
marginal cost of labour) in the long run.
3In other
words, labour productivity and the aggregate real
wage should move together over long periods.
Or, equivalently, the labour income share of
GDP should tend to revert to its mean.
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CHART 1
Labour Productivity, the Aggregate Real
Wage and Real GDP Per Capita
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draw attention to a few issues that arise in
measuring labour income. The bottom line in
Chart 2 shows that wages and salaries
4increased
from under 45 percent of GDP in 1926 to over
55 percent in the mid-1970s. The upward
trend largely reﬂects migration of workers from
farms and unincorporated businesses (UBs) into
the paid labour force. Chart 3 shows that farm
and UB income declined from about 19 percent
of GDP in the mid-1940s to about 5 percent
in the 1980s. While the agricultural sector con-
tinued its decline through to 2001, the income
share of the UB sector rose by two percentage
points beginning in the early 1980s, largely due
to an increase in self-employment. These devel-
opments have tended to offset one another, such
that the farm and UB income share of GDP has
been stable since the early 1980s (see Chart 4).
We modify labour income to take into
account changes in the share of farm and UB
income as follows: We ﬁrst calculate the aver-
age share of wages, salaries and supplementary
labour income as a percentage of GDP less farm
and UB income (57 percent over the period
1926-2001).
5We then apply the constant pro-
portion to divide farm and UB income into a
labour and non-labour income component.
6
This section of the paper focuses on before-tax
measures of household and corporate income.
We consider the implications of changes in
taxes less transfers to persons for living stan-
dards in the following section.
Chart 2 illustrates the deﬁnition of
labour income deﬁned above as a percentage
of GDP over the period 1926-2001. The
series exhibits large, persistent deviations
from its historical mean, lasting over a
decade during some episodes. For example,
the labour income share of GDP was below
its mean throughout the 15-year period
1927-41 and above its mean throughout the
12-year period 1966-77.
More rigorous econometric methods can
be used to test whether the labour income
share of GDP has tended to revert to its mean
over the historical period. A Chow test pro-
vides evidence of a shift in the mean in 1994
at the 6-percent level of signiﬁcance.
7 There is
little evidence of a shift, however, when we
test for a structural shift at an unknown break-
point — one cannot reject the null hypothe-
sis of a constant mean even at the 10-percent
level of signiﬁcance. Similarly, unit root tests
provide weak evidence that the labour income
share of GDP is mean-stationary. This ﬁnd-
ing contrasts with the results obtained by
Hostland (1996). The conﬂict can be recon-
ciled by the fact that the unit root tests are
59
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can reject the unit root hypothesis at the 1-
percent level over the period 1950-94, which
corroborates the results reported in Hostland.
The evidence in support of mean-stationarity
diminishes, however, when the sample period
is extended to 2001. One can reject the unit
root hypothesis at only the 7-percent level over
the period 1950-2001. These results indicate
that the decline in the labour income share in
1994 brings into question its tendency to
revert to its mean over time. Hence, we con-
clude that formal statistical tests are incon-
clusive about whether one can expect the
labour income share of GDP to revert to its
mean in the future.
Non-Labour Income
Labour income is but one source of
household income. Many households receive
income from interest and investment earnings.
Moreover, retained earnings by corporations are
a potential source of income for those house-
holds that hold equity (either directly or indi-
rectly, in mutual funds and pension plans). One
must also take into account the non-labour
component of income earned by farms and
UBs. In order to maintain consistency with the
before-tax measure of labour income examined
above, we include corporate proﬁts before taxes
in non-labour income.
Chart 4 illustrates the following three
components of non-labour income as per-
centages of GDP:
> corporate proﬁts before taxes
> interest and investment earnings
> the non-labour component of farm and
UB income
Corporate proﬁts as a percentage of
GDP declined substantially during the Great
Depression in the 1930s and again during the
recession in the early 1990s. There was a
strong rebound in the mid-1990s, raising cor-
porate proﬁts to an average level of 11 percent
of GDP over the period 1995-2001, which is
equal to its historical average over the post-war
period. The decline in the labour income share
of GDP in 1994 therefore cannot be attributed
to a rise in corporate proﬁts. Interest and invest-
ment income increased from 4 percent of GDP
in the early 1970s to a peak of 10 percent in
1982, and then subsequently declined to an
average of 5 percent over the four-year period
1998-2001.
Chart 4 shows that many of the shifts
in the components of non-labour income
have tended to offset one another. Non-
labour income exhibited a tendency to revert
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the period 1926 to 2001. This is supported
by unit root tests, which indicate that the
non-labour income share of GDP is mean-
stationary.
8 The non-labour income share of
GDP nonetheless exhibits large, persistent
deviations from its mean, some lasting sev-
eral years.
Other Components of National 
Income
We now examine components of
national income that are not included in
the measures of labour and non-labour
income examined above. We focus on the
following four main components, depicted
in Chart 5:
> inventory valuation adjustment (IVA)
> net investment payments to non-
residents
> indirect taxes less subsidies
> capital consumption allowances (CCA) 
Chart 5 shows that there were sizeable
ﬂuctuations in each of these components over
the historical period. The IVA share of GDP
ﬂuctuated substantially during the inﬂation-
ary episodes in the 1970s. Net investment
payments to non-residents increased from 1.5
percent of GDP in the mid-1970s to 3.5 per-
cent in the early 1990s. Both of these com-
ponents have shown little change over the
past decade, however. Indirect taxes increased
considerably from a low of 9.1 percent in
1980 to a peak of 13.4 percent in 1993,
before declining to 11.7 percent in 2001.
Indirect taxes therefore cannot account for
the decline in the labour share of GDP in
1994.
9
Changes in the CCA income share of
GDP play a key role in our analysis. To illus-
trate, Charts 2 and 4 show labour and non-
labour income shares of Net Domestic
Product (NDP), deﬁned as GDP less CCA.
Both labour income and non-labour income
exhibit much smaller ﬂuctuations as shares of
NDP versus GDP. Moreover, labour income
as a percentage of NDP is only slightly below
its historical mean in the 1990s. This indi-
cates that the decline in labour’s share of
GDP in 1994 can be largely attributed to an
increase in CCA. This is supported by formal
statistical tests. For example, unit root tests
provide strong evidence that the labour
income and non-labour income shares of
NDP are mean-stationary.
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STANDARDS
We now address the methodological ques-
tion of whether labour productivity growth in
excess of real wage growth necessarily curtails the
advancement of living standards.
Consider the case where there is a shift
between labour and non-labour income. Since
the household sector as a whole owns UBs
and corporate equity, income from interest
and investments, farms and UBs, and corpo-
rate retained earnings augment household
wealth. Since not all households have these
assets, there can be important implications
for the distribution of wealth across house-
holds. The overall effects on living standards
are unclear.
Now consider the implications of shifts
between labour income and the “other income”
components of GDP, namely CCA, IVA and
net investment payments to non-residents. An
increase in any of these income components
clearly reduces household wealth. In particu-
lar, the gradual increase in CCA as a percent-
age of GDP after the 1970s implies that a
growing proportion of national income is need-
ed to replace depreciating capital, and hence
less income is available to households and cor-
porations for a given level of production. For
this reason, NDP (GDP less CCA) per capita
is a better measure of living standards than the
more conventional GDP per capita measure.
Similarly, the reduction in net payments to for-
eigners as a percentage of GDP since the mid-
1990s implies that proportionally more
income is retained by domestic households.
One should also take this into account when
measuring advances in living standards.
Taxes and Living Standards
Chart 6 shows that tax revenues from
all sources less transfers to persons
10 increased
from 20 percent of GDP in the mid-1980s to
an average level of 25 percent over the period
1997-2001. This implies a ﬁve-percentage-
point reduction in after-tax income as a per-
centage of GDP. The implications of an
increase in the overall tax burden for living
standards is complicated by several factors.
Taxes are used to fund ﬁscal expenditures,
which beneﬁt households and businesses. There
is strong public support for public expenditures
in many areas, health care and education being
prime examples. Moreover, public investments
in developing physical infrastructure (airports,
roads, water, sewerage, public transportation,
62
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growth can also be enhanced by public invest-
ments in research and innovation. On the other
hand, high marginal tax rates reduce incentives
to work, save and invest, which act to reduce
labour supply, capital accumulation and pro-
ductivity growth. High marginal tax rates can
also raise compliance costs associated with tax
evasion and avoidance (resulting in more activ-
ity in the underground economy, for example).
In order to assess the implications of a rising tax
burden for living standards, one must weigh the
beneﬁts derived from public expenditures
against the distortion costs incurred by having
to raise tax revenues.
The intertemporal nature of public debt
also plays an important role in these calcula-
tions. Net public debt increased substantially,
from 14 percent of GDP in 1974 to 88 percent
in the mid-1990s.
11 From a simple accounting
perspective, this reﬂects a growing ﬁscal imbal-
ance with expenditures on program spending
and debt-service costs exceeding total tax rev-
enues. Net public debt declined to 66 percent
of GDP in 2000, a decline of 22.5 percentage
points over ﬁve years. Higher tax revenues and
lower program spending were needed to cover
the rising debt-service costs and reduce the
debt burden to a sustainable level. The build-
up in net public debt from the mid-1970s to
the mid-1990s and subsequent decline had an
important inﬂuence on intertemporal alloca-
tion of after-tax incomes. The implications for
household wealth are unclear, however, because
an increase in net public debt implies higher
future tax liabilities.
Changes made to the Canada Pension
Plan (CPP) in the mid-1990s are a good exam-
ple of this. Increases in CPP contributions were
introduced to reduce future unfunded liabili-
ties of the plan. In addition, the “pay-as-you-
go” funding scheme was modiﬁed to include
partial funding. These changes have implica-
tions for the intertemporal allocation of CPP
contributions for individuals, and for inter-
generational equity as well, but do not affect
household wealth at the aggregate level. The
increase in CPP contributions has reduced
after-tax incomes, but the implications for
national living standards are ambiguous.
The national-income accounting frame-
work also falls short in measuring advances in liv-
ing standards in other important dimensions. For
instance, capital gains earned on real and ﬁnan-
cial assets are not captured by the national
accounts. As a consequence, the above analysis
does not include the substantial increase in house-
hold wealth arising from the dramatic rise in
63
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analysis does not take into account capital gains
associated with the effect of unanticipated changes
in inﬂation on the real value of outstanding long-
term bonds. In short, the deﬁnition of non-labour
income outlined above provides an incomplete
measure of household wealth.
The analysis also fails to take into
account changes in relative consumer versus
producer prices that affect the real purchasing
power of households. A decrease in consumer
prices relative to producer prices implies that
households can consume more in real terms for
a given level of production. Chart 7 shows that
the Consumer Price Index (CPI) declined rel-
ative to the GDP price deﬂator from the early
1930s to the late 1970s, raising the real pur-
chasing power of households. The CPI has
subsequently increased relative to the GDP
price deﬂator, eroding the real purchasing
power of households. These relative price
changes reﬂect several underlying factors such
as movements in the relative price of traded
versus non-traded goods. In particular, the
depreciation of the Canada-US exchange rate
beginning in the mid-1970s raised the prices
of imported goods, which make up a larger
component of the CPI than the GDP price
deﬂator. It is worth pointing out here that
productivity advances abroad can lead to lower
import prices and thereby raise the real pur-
chasing power of domestic consumers. For
example, technological innovations in the pro-
duction of semiconductors in the United
States over the past decade have led to dra-
matic reductions in the real price of informa-
tion and communication technology (ICT)
equipment in Canada. This is an example of
productivity advances abroad raising the
domestic standard of living but having no
direct effect on the producer real wage.
12
It should also be noted that the measure
of labour productivity examined above is
deﬁned as GDP per hour worked, whereas
advances in living standards are typically meas-
ured as GDP per capita. Changes in hours
worked per capita therefore lead to a divergence
between labour productivity and living stan-
dards. Chart 8 shows that hours worked per
capita increased throughout the 1960s and
1970s. This reﬂects changes in demographic
factors, as well as labour market developments.
Maturing of the baby boom generation over
this period raised the working-age component
of the population. There was a dramatic increase
in the participation of women in the labour
force at the same time. These trends were par-
tially offset by a decrease in average weekly
hours worked during the 1960s, along with an
increase in the unemployment rate in the
1970s. Large cyclical ﬂuctuations in the unem-
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also had a major inﬂuence. Overall, the upward
trend in hours worked per capita since the
1970s has raised living standards in excess of
advances in labour productivity. This is illus-
trated in Chart 1, which compares indices of
GDP per capita versus GDP per hour worked.
GDP per capita grew at an average annual rate
of 2.0 percent over the period 1971-2001,
while GDP per hour worked grew at an aver-
age annual rate of only 1.4 percent.
CONCLUSIONS
Our analysis of national income shares
indicates that the decline in the labour income
share in 1994 can be largely attributed to an
increase in capital consumption allowances
(CCA). Casual observation and formal statisti-
cal tests indicate that labour income and non-
labour income shares of NDP (GDP less CCA)
tended to revert to their respective means over
the historical period 1926-2001. Deviations
can last for periods of several years, however.
Hence, one can expect labour productivity
growth and real wage gains to diverge for sev-
eral years at a time.
The implications for living standards are
unclear, however. Shifts between labour and
non-labour income have little if any effect on
household wealth at the aggregate level. The
implications of changes in taxes and transfers
for persons for living standards are complicat-
ed by several factors. Both before-tax and after-
tax measures of income can give a misleading
impression of advances in living standards.
Analysing shifts in national income shares can
provide valuable insights into underlying eco-
nomic developments but does not provide reli-
able measures of advances in living standards over
time or across countries. Several important aspects
of living standards are not captured by the nation-
al income accounts, including changes in capital
gains, relative consumer versus producer prices,
and hours worked per capita. Moreover, the
national income framework is not amenable to
addressing issues such as the distribution of
income, which often play a prominent role in
assessing policy options.
We conclude that policy-makers should
not be concerned with the recent divergence
between labour productivity growth and real
wage gains. This is not to imply that labour
productivity is unimportant for policy analy-
sis. On the contrary, real wage gains can only
be sustained by advances in labour productiv-
ity, other things being equal. Labour produc-
tivity growth has been the chief source of
advances in living standards over the historical
period (Harris 2002; Sharpe, this volume).
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ther increases in hours worked per capita to
raise living standards. There is little scope for a
continued rise in the labour force participation
of women. Moreover, impending demograph-
ic trends will act to reduce the working-age
component of the population and put down-
ward pressure on labour force participation
rates as the baby boom generation retires over
the next few decades. Advances in labour pro-
ductivity will be needed just to maintain liv-
ing standards.
On a ﬁnal note, we want to stress that NDP
per capita provides only a rough measure of our
standard of living. Economic progress has several
more dimensions. We believe that policy analysis
should be based on more meaningful measures of
economic progress that take into account changes
in household consumption, wealth and the distri-
bution of income. Recent developments by
Osberg and Sharpe (2001, 2002) and Sharpe
(2002) on measuring “economic well-being” using
these kinds of indicators represent a step in this
direction. Further analysis along these lines will
result in better measures of economic progress over
time and across countries, and thereby provide a
more reliable basis for policy decisions.
NOTES
The views expressed in this paper are those of the
authors and not those of the Department of Finance. The
authors would like to thank Pierre Fortin, Craig Riddell
and Andrew Sharpe for several valuable comments.
1 This paper focuses on labour productivity and labour
income in the total economy (the business and
government sectors combined). Labour income can be
more accurately described as labour compensation, because
it includes wages, salaries and supplementary labour
income. We also focus on the producer real wage so that
labour income is deﬂated using the GDP price deﬂator.
The implications of changes in consumer versus
producer prices are considered later in the paper. A
detailed description of the data is available upon request.
2 The statistics reported in the text and in Table 1 are
calculated by averaging annual growth rates. Similar
results are obtained by calculating compounded
growth rates.
3 This relationship can be derived in the short run
using a Cobb-Douglas production function with
perfect competition in product and factor markets.
The relationship can be derived in the long run
under much more general assumptions.
4 More precisely, wages, salaries and supplementary
labour income.
5 Average of (wages, salaries and supplementary labour
income) / (GDP - farm and UB income).
6 Labour income = wages, salaries and supplementary
labour income + 0.57 (farm and UB income).
7 Detailed results obtained from all statistical tests are
available upon request.
8 These results are available upon request.
9 Since the components of national income sum to one,
by deﬁnition, the decline in the labour and non-
labour income share of GDP in the early 1990s is
equivalent to the increase in the “other income
components” listed above.
10 Direct taxes include taxes paid on labour and
investment income, corporate income and capital
gains, as well as contributions to the Employment
Insurance (EI) program and the Canada and Quebec
Pension Plans (CPP/QPP). Indirect taxes include
taxes on production and imports. Transfers include
all transfers made to persons and businesses.
11 This refers to net debt at the federal, provincial and
local levels combined on a national accounts basis.
12 The relative consumer/producer price decline would
be reﬂected in a divergence between the consumer
real wage and the producer real wage.
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